We study equilibria for economies with hidden action in environments in which the agents' co tual relationships with competing financial intermediaries cannot be monitored (or are no tractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts for such econo as well as discuss their welfare properties. Depending on the parameters of the economy, the optimal action choice is not sustained in equilibrium or, if it is, agents necessarily ente multiple contractual relationships and intermediaries make positive profits, even underfree conditions. The main features and implications of these environments are consistent with stylized facts of markets for unsecured loans.
1. Introduction * Models of contracts with asymmetric information are usually models of exclusive con relationships. In other words, it is assumed that a party in a contract can enforceably res other party's participation in contractual relationships with other agents.1 As a conse agents cannot undo the incentive effects of one contract by engaging in additional cont relationships with other agents or institutions. In terms of informational requirements, contracts effectively require that the institutions which design the contracts are able to pe monitor the agents' trades with other institutions. Also, courts can enforce exclusive co only if agents' trades are observable and verifiable, which requires a rich institutional s allowing for some centralized information about trades.
Enforceability of exclusive contracts is a strong assumption, and while it is a very Only rarely do debt covenants in financial contracts include in fact explicit exc (Asquith and Wizman, 1990; Smith and Warner, 1979) .
In particular, markets for unsecured or partially secured loans do not seem implicitly through exclusive contracts. Consumer credit markets are a clear exam in the United States, consumers hold several credit cards and are constantly solic accounts; also, consumers often finance the acquisition of many durable goods, like and electronic appliances, with distinct debt contracts. Information sharing a frequently absent or imperfect in most countries for small business transactions Pagano, 2000) .
Unsecured and partially secured loan markets constitute a relevant compo markets in general. In the United States, for instance, revolving consumer loan card loans) are unsecured, and they account for more than a third of outstanding c Moreover, a consistent share of consumer credit in general-including, for exam mobile home, and education loans-is only partially secured (Ausubel, 1997) .2 Wh unsecured or partially secured credit contracts is, of course, default risk. In the cr for instance, delinquency rates (the percentage of accounts 30 days or more p peaks of about 3.5%; similarly, chargeoff rates (the percentage of outstanding b off as uncollectible) peak at about 5% (Ausubel, 1997) .
Other markets that could be appropriately modelled as characterized by non tractual relationships include farm credit markets in less-developed countries, wher eylenders and family-related informal financial transactions interact and compet other formal financial institutions. The success of microfinance programs like th in Bangladesh is often explained in terms of their ability to partially relax the in straints on exclusivity by means of extensive monitoring of trades (see, e.g., Mo addition, the market for private lending to governments and other international in some aspects of nonexclusivity: a lack of information sharing across banks ha after the Latin American debt crisis in the 1970s as well as after the Asian crisis Radelet and Sachs, 1998) . Finally, nonexclusivity, in the specific form of the in firms to monitor the portfolio positions of their managers, has possibly important managerial incentive structure induced by stock-based compensation schemes, a Ofek and Yermack (2000) .
In this article we study in particular economies with moral hazard in the form o to capture some abstract features of credit markets in which the borrowers need t prevent insolvency, and private default provisions are either contractually specified by courts. In such economies, agents choose a costly action to limit the probabili The action is agents' private information and, more specifically, affects the probab of the agent's future income. Default is not strategic, as we interpret an unsucc of the agent's future income shock as a state of insolvency and default. Financi issue contracts whose default provisions insure agents on their outcome realizatio able to condition on their action choice.
We analyze economies in which the action is dichotomous ("high" or "low" briefly discuss some of the implications of the corresponding model with a riche action variable. For instance, when the agent is a consumer, the high action might an extra job opportunity or, when the agent is an entrepreneur, of an indivisible in For this class of economies we are able to characterize equilibria with none show that for an open set of economies, in particular those with a relatively hig there exist only inefficient equilibria in which the low action is implemented. For t if both at the incentive-constrained optimal contract and at the autarchic (no-trade) allo would choose high action. These equilibria occur because of the intermediaries' incent insure agents conditionally on their undertaking the low action whenever other int provide insurance at more favorable terms for the agents. As a consequence, high only be sustained, if at all, as an equilibrium when contracts can be designed to prev other contracts that adversely affect incentives for the incumbents. We show that e implement high action can be sustained for an open set of economies, and require t of "latent contracts," i.e., contracts that are not actively traded in equilibrium but who reduces the profitability of equilibrium deviations for potential entrants. Latent con the purpose of restricting the entry of other contracts that would have negative incen on the incumbents and thereby moderate the effects of nonexclusivity. On the othe contracts guarantee rents to the incumbents in equilibria that support agents' high a
As a consequence, we show that the high action can be implemented in equilib intermediaries necessarily make positive profits. Furthermore, in equilibrium agents gage in multiple contractual relationships with different lenders. Multiple contracts to prevent the active intermediaries from deviating to contracts guaranteeing even hig Latent contracts take the form of available lines of credit at high interest rates (fair co on the agents' low action).
Some existing evidence suggests that both supranormal profits and multiple cred ships with different lenders may characterize some markets for unsecured loans. Th market provides our best example, as data for it are readily available. In fact, agent hold several cards, on average more than seven per household in the United States (an to Evans and Schmalensee (1999) , more than nine for those households that hold a Also, as documented in detail by Ausubel (1991 Ausubel ( , 1997 , since the deregulation of the market in 1982, the profits of credit card companies in the United States range from t times higher than the standard profits in the banking industry (interest rates are about the cost of funds adjusted for default risks).3 Latent contracts, i.e., available credit lines at high interest rates, also seem to c credit card markets in the form of frequent mailing and telemarketing solicitations number of direct-mail solicitations from credit card issuers totalled more than two per American household on average; Ausubel (1997) ).
Several pieces of evidence also suggest that the main implications of our analysi consistent with the observed structure of unsecured credit markets other than credit c Multiple credit sources, for instance, are documented by Petersen and Rajan (1994) f market for unsecured loans to small businesses; that article also presents some ev "pecking order" in credit sources that can be interpreted as evidence of the availabil lines at high interest rates. In Europe. multiple credit sources are more prevalent: D Garella, and Guiso (2000) document in detail the Italian case. Also, Jappelli and Pag provide a cross-country analysis of credit markets, bankruptcy institutions, private cre and public credit registers. Multiple credit relationships for small business are common as our analysis implies, in those countries where information-sharing institutions am (private credit bureaus and public credit registers) are either recent or only partial Furthermore, default rates are about twice as high on average in such countries, consistent with the implications of our analysis of economies with nonexclusive cont Finally, we show that nonexclusivity has important welfare effects. When contr tionships are nonexclusive, two forms of moral hazard arise. First, agents' choice private information. Second, agents' choice of trades is also private information. W equilibrium allocations, not surprisingly, are inefficient from the point of view of a does not control the effort choice but does control the agents' trade. On the other h 3 More conservative estimates of the profitability of the credit card market in the 1980s emerge from of the Discover Card program in Lapuerta and Myers (1997) . No consensus is reached in the literature on t of the credit card industry in the long run; see Evans and Schmalensee (1999) . a planner facing the same observability constraints that intermediaries face; that controls neither the effort choice nor the agents' trade. We show that equilibria are the point of view of such a planner, that is, there is no other feasible allocation respect to the observability constraints) that is preferred to an equilibrium alloca the agents and the intermediaries. We say that equilibria are incentive-constrained third-best efficient. This is true even though, as we noted, in equilibrium interm perfect competitors and entry is prevented via latent contracts.
a Related literature. The analysis of hidden-action economies in nonexclusive en has been pioneered by Arott and Stiglitz in a sequence of unpublished papers in t (their work is now collected in Amott and Stiglitz (1993) ) and by the enlightening their work by Hellwig (1983) .4 Our article is mostly related to this line of work.
same class of economies as do Amott and Stiglitz and Hellwig, but we postulate a space that allows for "negative insurance" contracts (i.e., insurance contracts that p income state). We see no compelling reason to exclude negative insurance from the Even though negative insurance contracts are not traded in equilibrium, in fact we sh presence in the contract space substantially reduces the set of contracts that are equilibrium of the game played by intermediaries. As a consequence, the equilib simpler structure, providing for sharper predictions. After introducing our resul we analyze more precisely the relationships between our article and those of Arno and Hellwig.
Our article also contributes to the literature started by Arott and Stiglitz and studying the question of constrained efficiency of equilibria. Although nonexclusiv poses on the economic environment additional constraints with respect to incentive and hence equilibria in general will not be incentive-constrained Pareto efficient, whether equilibria are third-best Pareto efficient once the constraints due to the are explicitly considered. We will answer the question affirmatively, in the sense facing the same observability constraints that intermediaries face at equilibrium allocation that is preferred to an equilibrium allocation by both the agents and the in Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) also study nonexclusive contracts in moral haza with hidden action. The structure of the game intermediaries and agents play i though, is quite different from ours (and from Arnott and Stiglitz's and Hellw particular, in Kahn and Mookherjee's economy, agents design their own contracts can only either accept or reject the agents' offers), they make contractual decision and their contractual portfolios are observable, even if not contractible upon. Suc in the strategic interactions of agents and intermediaries have a crucial effect allocations and contracts. In our economy, because intermediaries in equilibrium ex due to the presence of "latent contracts," intermediaries necessarily make positiv agents face distorted insurance prices at equilibrium. On the contrary, intermedia profits and agents face fair insurance prices in equilibrium in Kahn and Mookerjee's e In Section 3 we will identify the modelling aspects that are responsible for the dif we obtain with respect to Kahn and Mookerjee. Parlour and Rajan (2001) independently study a model of strategic default in un market economies with nonexclusive contractual relationships.5 Our analysis has m in common with theirs, including the existence of equilibria with positive profits. Th contrast to our hidden-action model, concentrates on strategic default and thus has th in equilibrium default is never observed, thereby contradicting the evidence from credit markets and, most important, making it impossible to derive any implicatio institutional characteristics of unsecured credit markets (e.g., regulatory constraints, t of information-sharing institutions) with default rates.6 The characterization of equ substantially different. For example, no latent contracts arise in their analysis, as out-of-equilibrium deviations by intermediaries are limited by the fact that if defau both the incumbents' and the entrants' profits are negatively affected. By contrast, a richer strategy space of intermediaries allows entrants to offer contracts that neg only the incumbents (by inducing low action on the part of the agents), as the entrant the implicit rate of return required on the contracts so as to guarantee themselves profits. Helpman and Laffont (1975) (see also Bisin and Gottardi, 1999 ) study competitive equilibria in economies with hidden action. In their setup, linearity of prices captures a strong form of nonexclusivity: each intermediary has no control over agents' trades, not even over trades of its own contracts. In the setup of the present article, intermediaries instead control agents' trades in the contracts they themselves issue.
Finally, our article is also related in part to the literature on Courot convergence to competitive equilibria; in Bisin, Gottardi, and Guaitoli (1999) we develop the analysis of the present article to study the issue in detail (see also Hellwig (2000) and Segal and Whinston (2003) ).
2. The economy * The general economy we study lasts two periods, t E {0, 1}. It is populated by a continuum of ex ante identical agents, indexed by i E I with total measure 1, and by a finite number of financial intermediaries, indexed by h E H; we will in general think of H as large as we want to model intermediation markets in which entry is free (requiring H to be finite is only for the purpose of avoiding technical difficulties of no substantial relevance in the analysis). Agents are risk averse. They value consumption in period 0 and 1, co and c respectively, and action e: u(co) + u(c) -e (units are chosen so that e is measured in utils, without loss of generality). We assume that u: -+ is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and lim,o u(c) = -oo.
The action is chosen in t = 0, is private information, and can take two values, e E {a, b} (but we will be careful in discussing which results are robust to the introduction of a richer support of the action variable). Without loss of generality, a > b. The choice of action affects the probability distribution of the uncertain income of the agents at time 1, a random variable wi that is i.i.d. across agents i E I, whose realization is publicly observable, and which takes values WH, WL, with WH > WL (from now on we drop the index i whenever confusion should not arise). Let 7Ta (respectively 7rb) denote the probability of income WH given action a (respectively b). Assume 7ra > 7rb. The reader will have noticed that H (respectively a) takes the interpretation of the "high income state" (respectively "high action"). We think of the high action as an action that helps prevent insolvency, that is, it reduces the probability of the low income state.
As is standard in moral hazard environments, we use the properties of large economies. In particular, the Law of Large Numbers allows us to identify re with the fraction of agents that observe the realization WH when producing action e (see Al-Najjar (1995) , Sun (1998) ).
Prior to the beginning of time, intermediaries strategically design contracts. Each intermediary h can design and issue Jh contracts, and J is the set of contracts issued overall. A contract prescribes a set of transfers from the intermediary to the buyer (possibly negative) conditional on publicly observable variables. Formally, a contract j C J is a vector dj representing the payoff at each date, 0 and 1, and state, H and L. Intermediaries can also make a contract divisible, In such an economy, contracts have both an insurance and a credit compon with nonexclusivity. This is indeed the case in markets for unsecured and part which motivate our analysis. Consider for instance the credit card market (se In this market, because contracts are nonexclusive, agents accumulate credi multiple contractual relationships (multiple credit cards). Agents are in genera income risks and, as a consequence, frequently let credit card accounts go deli companies often simply charge off the delinquent accounts, thereby extending insurance provision to their debtors. Credit limits and implicit insurance prov by credit card companies for an environment in which contracts are nonexclu multiple credit accounts.
To simplify the analysis, while capturing the fundamental properties of u tially secured credit markets, we consider two special cases and deal separately and private insurance provisions.
In the first economy, which we call thepure insurance economy, private defa contractually specified, but we restrict credit limits at time t = 0 to be exogenou further loss of generality, we normalize the agents' borrowing position at zero.8 economy is simply a standard insurance economy with moral hazard. In the s analyze, which we call the credit economy, we restrict instead state L to represe in which agents consume an exogenous amount WL, that is, their endowment provision exogenously determined by bankruptcy laws. On the other hand, in limits are determined endogenously, agents borrow to finance consumption at their debt at time 1 in state H.
In fact, the insurance and the credit economy turn out to be essentially equivalent in terms of our analysis and results. Therefore we proceed first with the analysis of the pure insurance economy because it is this economy that has been studied in the literature to which we mean to compare our results: Arott and Stiglitz (1993), Hellwig (1983) , and Kahn and Mookerjee (1998) . In Section 4 we will then show how all of our results extend to the unsecured credit economy.
We will also provide some simulations to show that the results extend to the general economic environment introduced in this section in which both the insurance and the credit dimension are jointly analyzed.
3. Insurance economy * Consider the pure insurance economy, in which agents consume only at time 1. We first introduce the definition of equilibrium we shall use in this article: equilibrium with nonexclusivity.
Given the set of contracts issued by intermediaries, agents choose which contracts to buy. This determines their consumption allocation. Agents also choose an action. Anticipating the choices of agents, as a function of the set of contracts they are allowed to trade, intermediaries strategically choose which contracts they issue, to maximize profits.9
The problem solved by agents can be formally described as follows. Each agent chooses an action e E {a, b}, portfolio choices X = {.j C Aj}jEj, and consumption c = (CL, CH), to 7 As it turns out, only one type of contract will be made divisible in equilibrium (the latent contracts in the highaction equilibria); to save on notation, we will often refer to a contract only by its transfers di, intended to be indivisible unless specified otherwise.
8 The normalization in fact amounts to letting w denote income net of repayment of the amount borrowed at time 0, and similarly to let dj denote contract's j payoff net of repayment of the amount borrowed at time 0.
9 We restrict the definition of equilibrium to the symmetric case in which all agents behave identically. This is just for the sake of notation, and we do not in fact make such an assumption in the analysis. represented by the lower envelope of ua and ub. Since (1 -b)/7b > (1 -7a)/ra, the marginal rate of substitution at any point is higher on ub than on ua.
Let C denote the subset of consumption allocations (CL, CH) > 0 that satisfy
It contains all allocations that involve positive insura are not more expensive than the fair prices when the a the fair prices when action a is chosen. In Figure 1 , the two (zero-profit) lines from the no-trade allocat contained in C (otherwise either profits are negativ contract to be issued).
then there exists a unique equilibrium allocation wit CH = CL = TbWH +(1 -Tb)WL and e = We call these low-action equilibria. With the help o of the proposition. Consider an allocation like A in t Such allocation can never be sustained as an equilibri figure. Rather than consuming allocation A and choo to buy additional insurance at the price (1 -Tb)/7rb But Proposition 1 requires this to hold for any consu condition, no allocation in C with high action can re allocation any intermediary could make positive profit slightly higher than (1 -rtb)/b. On the other hand, can never make losses. We conclude that under the c is necessarily represented by action b and the consum facing a fair insurance price conditional on action b, cb in the figure, the full-insurance allocation conditi equilibria. To see this, consider an economy with logarithmic preferences, u(c an economy, condition (5) Proposition 2. Suppose that, for an open subset of consumption allocations (CL, CH) C C,
then any equilibrium allocation in pure strategies satisfies (7) with e = a.12
We call these high-action equilibria. Equation (7) defines the locus of allocations such that, when associated with the high action, agents are as well off as they would be buying the optimal level of additional insurance at price (1 -7rb)/b and switching to e = b. The properties of high-action equilibria can be illustrated with the help of Figure 2 , in the case of logarithmic preferences.
With logarithmic preferences, property (7) becomes exp{-A} = (1 -b) + b ( ) For A small enough, such an equation has two solutions in CH/CL, repre line (7) and line (7) . 13 We proceed now to show that any high-action eq (7) . From any allocation in the interior of the cone, in fact, another allo by agents can be reached with a contract making nonnegative profits. Th for allocations on (7) . Finally, any allocation lying outside of the cone sa 7ra)U(CL) -U(7bCH + (1 -b)CL) -A < 0 and hence cannot be supported a high action.
An allocation such as ca on (7) may be supported as an equilibrium even if divisible contracts offering positive or negative insurance at price (1 -rb)/7b are also issued. At any allocation on (7), consider again ca for instance-agents are by construction indifferent between choosing action a and moving to allocation Cb with action b. But since allocation cb is the most preferred allocation that can be reached from ca with a contract that allows the agents to buy any amount of insurance (a divisible contract) at price (1 -rb)/7rb, we can assume that such contracts would remain untraded if issued (latent); moreover, we can assume that such contracts are in fact issued, as they guarantee nonnegative profits to the issuer.
Latent contracts are a necessary component of equilibrium. Consider an agent trading two contracts to consume ca in equilibrium: the first takes him from w to m, and the second from m 12 The case in which (6) is satisfied for a zero-measure subset of C is nongeneric in the parameters of our economy, as it is immediately demonstrated by locally perturbing A. Refer to the Appendix for a discussion of this case.
13 A condition on the parameters is needed to guarantee that the cone from the origin generated by these two lines does not include the no-trade point, w, as in the figure; such wCH (7) (7) CL to ca. Without the latent contract, another intermediary could offer a contract that takes the agent from m to some point ca', which the agent prefers to ca, and possibly to the allocation he can reach buying all three contracts offered. But with the latent contracts, as the agent reaches a point outside the area defined by (7), he can do even better by getting more insurance and switching to action b, reaching a point like cb . If, and only if, the latent contracts are issued, then the intermediary offering the deviation contract makes negative profits.
Let J1 denote the subset of the set of contracts J that contains contracts actively traded in equilibrium, i.e., contracts j such that Xj > 0. Our main characterization result regarding high-action equilibria is the following.
Proposition 3. At a high-action equilibrium, each agent actively trades multiple contracts:
the cardinality of J1 is > 1, all of which guarantee positive profits to the intermediaries offering them:
To illustrate the first result of Proposition 3, note that for an allocation like ca in Figure 2 to represent an equilibrium, it is necessary that agents actually trade multiple contracts; there are two in this case: the first takes agents from w to m, the second from m to ca. Such contracts are constructed, in fact, to prevent the two intermediaries who are active in equilibrium from deviating and charging a higher price for their contract. They have the property that agents are indifferent between buying either one or both of them. Therefore, a deviation that worsens the terms of trade of one of the contracts would have the effect that such a contract is not traded. The crucial property that prevents the deviations of the incumbent intermediaries is that the indifference curve for action a through ca cuts the implicit insurance price line, connecting the no-trade allocation point w with the consumption allocation ca, twice: at Ca and at m. A single intermediary offering both contracts and allowing agents to consume at the same allocation ca, with no other active intermediary, would not sustain the equilibrium, as he could deviate and increase profits by charging a higher price for insurance.14 As for the latent contracts, there must be at least two intermediaries, each selling a divisible contract for a large-enough quantity of insurance: agents can then always buy the optimal 14 In general there can be many equilibria with different numbers of active intermediaries: in the limit as such number goes to infinity, each intermediary offers a negligible quantity of insurance and the price of insurance equates the (negative of the) tangent to the indifference curve at the equilibrium allocation.
amount in response to any entry, and the intermediaries selling the latent contracts profitable deviations.
We can finally see on Figure 2 why positive profits are necessary in equilibrium allocation sustained by contracts making zero profits and lying on (7) is cob. To be an for some number of active intermediaries n > 1, as we just argued, the indifference cut the fair-price line, with slope (1 -rta)/7ra, twice: at cob = w + d and at w + [(n In the limit, as n -> oo, the indifference curve should be tangent to the fair-price li action e = a, indifference curves have a slope (1 -Ta)/7a at full insurance and a st in the region of underinsurance, as at cob. In this region, then, they can only cut th line once from above. Therefore, cb cannot be supported as a high-action equilibriu number n of active intermediaries. The same argument used to show that multiple relationships are necessary at high-action equilibria implies that cob cannot be suppo one active intermediary; such an intermediary would deviate to a contract with posi along (7).
High-action equilibria do exist. We can easily show this by considering an economy with logarithmic preferences, u(c) = In c. By Proposition 2, a high-action equilibrium necessarily lies on (7). In the logarithmic case, we have repeatedly argued, (7) is the lower edge of the cone defined by exp{-A} ( L < (1 -jb) + rb
We will first construct a limit equilibrium, in which the number of active intermediaries, n, tends to infinity.16 In this case, each agent's indifference curve at the equilibrium allocation must be tangent to the price of insurance. To demonstrate the existence of such an equilibrium, therefore, it suffices to show that there exists an allocation on (7) with this property, that is, such that the indifference curve through the allocation is tangent to the price line from the endowment w to the allocation. But, as a consequence of homotheticity of preferences, the marginal rate of substitution is constant along any ray from the origin, in particular along (7) . Moreover, the marginal rate of substitution along (7) is greater in absolute value than (1 -7a)/7ra, since (7) is steeper than the full-insurance line. It is also smaller than (1 -xb)/7rb whenever the cone defined by (7) has a nonempty interior (the generic case). This is the case because when the cone has a nonempty interior, (7) is less steep than the line CH = (1 -7b)7ra/7rb(l -7a)CL, the singular solution of (7) when the cone collapses into a line, along which the marginal rate of substitution is (1 -7b)/7lb.
We conclude that it is always possible to find a price line from the endowment w, with slope p in absolute value, (1 -ra)/ra < p < (1 -Tb)/rb, which cuts (7) tangentially at the indifference curve; therefore a high-action equilibrium exists in the limit case with n -* oo.
Equilibria with a finite number of active intermediaries, finite n, can now be constructed for lower insurance prices, with the only caveat that integer constraints must be satisfied.
Note also that our analysis of the logarithmic economy demonstrates that in this case, aggregate equilibrium profits for intermediaries increase with the number of intermediaries that are active at equilibrium.
We turn now to a discussion of how our characterization of equilibria for economies with dichotomous action extends to economies with continuous-action variables, in which for instance the action variable takes the interpretation of costly effort in the success of an investment. Our analysis of low-effort equilibria is immediately extended to economies with a continuous hiddenaction variable and nonexclusive contractual relationships. If the support of the action variable is continuous and connected, e.g., the interval [b, a] , and the dependence of the probability distribution of income on the action is smooth, low-effort equilibria, characteriz insurance allocation and the minimal action b, in fact arise precisely under condit The characterization of equilibria in which an action strictly higher than b is difficult. Our analysis of the dichotomous case shows, though, that high-effor supported when a discontinuity arises in the agents' choice of action as their allocatio rically varied. The construction of high-effort equilibria in the dichotomous case i latent contracts, which operate by inducing "large" discontinuous shifts in the ag as a consequence of the entry of a contract that deviates from the equilibrium. S nuities follow in general from the nonconvexity of the agents' choice problem. M our analysis indicates that high-effort equilibria could be supported, for economie unobservable action lies in a continuous domain, provided that assumptions on the action to the probability distribution of income (concavity of the preference ind maintained) are made which guarantee that the agents' objective function lacks co appropriate range of consumption allocations (the lack of connectedness of the action variable would also do, as would the lack of continuity of the probability d income as a function of the action).
[ Welfare. We are now ready to study the welfare properties of equilibria with n
In the class of economies we study in this article, two forms of moral hazard arise. F of action e on the part of the agents is private information. Second, the choice of part of the agents is also private information. We therefore introduce two different optimality.
At an incentive-constrained optimum the planner does not control the effort choice but does control the agents' trade. If equilibria with nonexclusivity were incentive-constrained optimal, then the unboservability of trades, the nonexclusivity, would not matter in equilibrium. We will show that in general, nonexclusivity matters; it introduces an externality in equilibrium, and equilibria are not incentive-constrained optimal.
At a third-best optimum, instead, the planner controls neither the effort choice nor the agents' trade. The planner faces in fact the same observability constraints that intermediaries face in equilibrium.
More precisely, at an incentive-constrained optimum the planner chooses the agents' action, the consumption allocation, and the set of contracts to be traded to maximize agents' utility subject to the following: the definition of consumption, equation (9); the condition that guarantees a given aggregate amount k of profits to intermediaries, equation (10); and the incentive-compatibility constraint, equation (11). We are interested only in the nontrivial case in which the high action, e = a, can be supported at an incentive-constrained optimum. We restrict attention to this case:
the incentive constraint guarantees that agents have no incentives, at the prescribed consumption allocation, to deviate and choose instead e = b.17
Definition 2. An incentive-constrained optimum supporting e = a is an array At a third-best optimum, the planner does not control agents' trades. Therefore the incentivecompatibility constraint is more restrictive in this case: it must guarantee that agents do not have an incentive to deviate both from the prescribed action and from the prescribed consumption allocation. We continue restricting attention to the case in which the high action, e = a, can be supported at an optimum; the condition in footnote (17) is sufficient also for this case of third-best optimum. When contemplating a deviation to e = b, agents anticipate being able to supplement the prescribed consumption allocation with any feasible trade at fair odds; tha facing insurance opportunities at price (1 -rb)/rb.18
Definition 3. A third-best optimum supporting e = a is an array (c,d) that maximizes (8) subject to equation (9), equation (10), and 7taU(CH) + (1 -7a)U(CL) -U(rbCH + (1 -Tb)CL)-A > 0. (12) Note that the incentive constraint, equation (12), coincides with the condition that gu existence with high-action equilibria, equation (6). Therefore, for those economies for w action equilibria arise, no third-best optimum supporting the high action, e = a, exist case, any third-best optimum can only support action b, and the planner cannot do any b offering full insurance at fair prices. We conclude that low-action equilibria are third-bes
Note that even though third-best optimal, the inefficiency associated with low-action is quite severe. For a robust set of economies, for instance, the following three prope simultaneously: (i) all equilibria are low action (hence they implement e = b); (ii) at the constrained optimum allocation, e = a; and (iii) if no contract were offered (i.e., at a agents would choose e = a.19
The following result, the main one of this section, concerns third-best optimal a that support the high action.
Proposition 4. High-action equilibria with nonexclusivity are third-best optimal.
To understand the third-best optimality of high-action equilibria, it is convenient terize the third-best optimum frontier. The frontier is parameterized by the aggregate intermediaries, k > 0. Consider Figure 4 (the figure is drawn for logarithmic preferenc argument extends). It is straightforward to see from the definition that third-best alloca porting the high action must belong to C and lie on (7) . Furthermore, moving along (7 of A, toward B, one moves along the third-best frontier in the direction of allocations pr agents. In other words, allocation B in Figure 4 is a third-best optimum associated wi profits k than allocation A (cob is the third-best optimal allocation preferred by agents, a with zero profits for intermediaries, k = 0). We conclude that high-action equilibria are t optimal, as, by Proposition 2, they must necessarily lie on (7).
This result may require an explanation. Proposition 2 shows that high-action equi supported by latent contracts and require positive profits for the intermediaries. Therefo effort equilibria never decentralize cob. As a consequence, high-effort equilibria induce a of the equilibrium price of insurance; more specifically, agents face in equilibrium les insurance odds. Consider Figure 4 , for instance: an equilibrium allocation such as B is by an implicit insurance price q > (1 -7a)/7ra. How can third-best optimality be ma despite this price distortion? The answer is that relative prices do not determine th consumption allocation at equilibrium, the incentive constraint does (the incentive con is binding at any high-action equilibrium allocation). In other words, prices do not agents' insurance positions are "rationed" in equilibrium.
We can illustrate this point with the help again of Figure 4 . The implicit insura agents face at allocation B is q, and intermediaries make profits k (in the figure, k is 1 -rTa) ). Suppose now that agents pay the lump-sum amount k to intermediaries out of their budget set but face no distortion in the implicit insurance price.
The budget set of agents after the lump-sum transfer to intermediaries is represented by the line passing through w' = w -[1/(1 -7a)]k, with slope (1 -7ra)/ra. The resulting third-best optimum allocation is therefore B, and the price distortion does not introduce any inefficiency.20 o Discussion. We have shown that in a hidden-action model with nonexclusivity, the optimal action is not implemented in equilibrium for an open set of economies and, for the economies in which it is implemented, that agents have multiple contractual relationships and intermediaries make positive profits.
These results differ from those reached by Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) (henceforth KM) and by Arnott and Stiglitz (1993) and Hellwig (1983) (henceforth ASH). In this subsection we attempt to explain such differences.
The possibility of either low-or high-action equilibria is a robust result, as it arises in all the different models (ours, as well as KM's and ASH's). All these authors, as we do, consider economies in which the action choice is dichotomous. But high-action equilibria in KM are always associated with zero profits for intermediaries, a result opposed to ours.
It is the different structure of the game that generates different equilibria. There are two main features that distinguish the strategic interaction of intermediaries postulated by KM and ours: whereas we study economies in which intermediaries design contracts simultaneously, KM (i) postulate a sequence of bilateral trades between each agent and the intermediaries and (ii) allow agents to design contracts, which agents themselves offer to the intermediaries in a prespecified sequence (offers are take-it-or-leave-it, each intermediary can only accept or reject an offer).
We want to argue that it is the agents' bargaining power, owing to their ability to design contracts and make take-it-or-leave-it offers, that drives KM's zero-profit result (differently from what they expected; see footnote 5 and section 6 in KM). The sequential nature of the offers is certainly not sufficient to generate zero profits in equilibrium. Suppose we maintain KM's sequential structure but modify the contract-design mechanism so as to allow the intermediaries to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the agents, rather than the opposite. In this case, in a subgameperfect equilibrium, it will never be the case that the first intermediary offers the contract that makes zero profits; he could in fact offer any contract that corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the sequential game studied in our article, thereby guaranteeing positive profits. In fact, the sequential structure of offers allows the first intermediary in the sequence to do better in general and extract 20 Even in the general economy in which agents consume at time t = 0, high-action equilibria are third-best efficient. The distortion on the price of insurance has no effect on the marginal condition that determines borrowing and lending, again because agents are "rationed" in the insurance market.
CH W (7) 45? //A I' cL CL all surplus, thereby exploiting both the barriers to entry-which, as our analysis has demonstrated, endogenously arise in markets for nonexclusive contracts-and the bargaining power due to her position in the sequence of offers.
In other words, our and KM's analysis of markets for nonexclusive contracts can be interpreted to show that: (i) competition of intermediaries in the design of contracts (and implicitly in their prices) is not sufficient to drive profits to zero, but (ii) if (and only if) agents are endowed with the whole bargaining power in the contractual relationships, intermediaries in equilibrium cannot exploit any market power by constructing barriers to entry.
As we argued in the Introduction, ASH study the same economy as we do, with intermediaries simultaneously designing contracts. They restrict the strategy space of intermediaries to contracts that offer positive insurance, i.e., to contracts whose payoff in state L is nonnegative, dL > 0. Even though contracts offering negative insurance are never traded in equilibrium, the restriction of the strategy space in ASH is not without loss of generality. We argue that such restriction expands the set of equilibria that can be supported by latent contracts. Suppose that some allocation, e.g., cA in Figure 5 , is supported by a latent contract that, added to the allocation cA, induces an allocation cB (by construction the agent is indifferent between consuming cA with action a and consuming cB with action b).
Suppose also that at cB the agent is overinsured, i.e., cB < cL, as is the case in Figure 4 , where cB is below the 45? line. Such a latent contract is never part of an equilibrium if negative insurance contracts are allowed, because such a contract can be profitably introduced that would be added to cB by the agents, (i) inducing action b on the part of the agents and thereby (ii) negative profits for the intermediary trading the latent contract (in Figure 5 , e.g., such a contract supports the allocation cc when added to cB). In ASH's environment, on the contrary, many equilibria are supported by such latent contracts (see Hellwig (1983) , in particular, for a characterization).
Credit economy
* Consider now the credit economy, in which agents in state L consume WL. The problem solved by agents can be formally described as follows. Each agent chooses an action e E {a, b}, portfolio choices X = {j E Aj }jEJ, and consumption c = (co, CH) to maximize (1)- (2), (Dh')h'h given.
We assume wo < (1/rb)wH to guarantee that agents will borrow in equilibrium rather than lend.
We argue that the pure insurance economy studied in the previous section and the credit economy introduced here are equivalent. More specifically, for the credit economy as well, equilibria are either low or high action; high-action equilibria are sustained by latent contracts, which guarantee positive profits for the intermediaries, and by multiple active contractual relationships.
Moreover, equilibria are incentive-constrained inefficient but third-best efficient.
All this should become apparent to the reader by studying, for the credit economy, the condition analogous to (6), that is, the incentive constraint associated with third-best optima. We will derive here this condition and then limit our analysis to pointing out the formal equivalence between the pure insurance and the credit economy.
For the credit economy, latent contracts are contracts that provide the agent with credit at a price 1 /rb. Such contracts necessarily guarantee nonnegative profits for the intermediaries offering them. An equilibrium allocation with high action therefore has the property that it must Then, for parameter configurations such that there exists no all ing (17), the only equilibrium is a low-action equilibrium with perf Otherwise, as in the pure insurance case, we have high-action equilibria. Such satisfy conditions similar to those derived for the pure insurance economy. Fir constraint (17) will be binding (otherwise another profitable credit contract can with agents still choosing the high action). Furthermore, to limit the market intermediaries, multiple contracting is needed such that a single intermediary do a net surplus to the agent (the local satiation or double intersection between the p indifference curve that we have seen in Proposition 3). At any such equilibrium necessarily make positive profits. In fact, the marginal rate of substitution betw always greater than 1 /ra above the 45? line, i.e., at all incentive-compatible alloc the zero-profit point on the third-best frontier cannot satisfy the "local satiation"
Finally, it is straightforward to show that high-action equilibria are third-best best efficient.
5. The general economy with credit and insurance * As we argued in the Introduction, contractual relationships in markets for un have both relevant credit and insurance components. We have studied separately a credit economy for the sake of simplicity. Analytical results for the economy and insurance, that is, for the general economy introduced in Section 2, are har this section we briefly report on some computations we have performed for sp We then proceed as follows.22 We first solve for the agent's equilibrium choice of borrowi at time t = 0, do, as a function of (CL, CH), and conditionally on the agent also choosing th high action e = a. We then substitute the solution into the incentive constraint, the constrain analogous to equation (6), and into preferences. By looking at such indirect utility functions an incentive constraints, effectively we reduce the consumption space to (CL, CH). This procedure the advantage that results can be directly compared to those of the insurance economy, analyz in detail in Section 3. The incentive-constrained region in the space (CL, CH), for our parametr example, is shown in Figure 6 . In the insurance economy, with logarithmic preferences, this set is a cone from the origin; in the general economy here it is still a cone, but translated from the orig Also, indirect indifference curves on the space (CL, CH) are regularly shaped and quasi-concav Finally, we have computed an equilibrium, in the limit case when n -* oo (the number active intermediaries), following the example by Hellwig reported in our analysis of the insuran economy.
At the equilibrium (see Figure 7 ) the implicit insurance price, the slope of the line from w -do to the equilibrium allocation c*, is less than (1 -7ta)/7a in absolute value, and therefore intermediaries make positive profits. Also, as in the pure insurance economy (and the credit economy), there is no equilibrium at which intermediaries make zero profits.
Conclusions
? Our analysis of the hidden-action model in economies in which contractual are nonexclusive has shown that equilibria in such environments have several st that have been associated with unsecured credit markets. In particular, when t supported, agents enter in equilibrium multiple contractual relationships and int positive profits. A model with endogenous borrowing and lending positions can generate in equilibrium a negative correlation between the amount borrowed and the action chosen by the agents, as a consequence of exogenous changes in the rate of return on borrowing and the insurance price. An exogenous reduction in the rate of return and in the price of insurance induces higher borrowing and possibly higher insurance in equilibrium. In such a model, in fact, agents perfectly smooth their consumption over time: nonexclusivity implies that any equilibrium contract must be immune to deviations in the form of pure borrowing and lending contracts, whose rate of return is constant and hence independent of the agents' action choice. This in turn might tighten the agents' incentive constraint and make it more difficult to sustain a high action. In an economy with a continuous-action variable and with enough nonconvexity of the agents' choice problem to support in equilibrium actions higher than the minimal action, the agents' choice of action at equilibrium might be reduced. Since default rates are in our interpretation measured by the probability of the low state, this would imply higher default rates.
The other fundamental stylized fact in the credit card industry is indeed the contemporaneous increase of the size of the market and of default rates. Delinquency rates on credit cards exhibited cyclical peaks of about 2.75% before 1982 and of about 3.5% after; similarly, chargeoff rates exhibited peaks of about 3.5% before 1982 and of about 5.0% after (Ausubel, 1997) . Such a If such a contract is introduced, agents will then buy all the contracts and ch insurance with a slope less than (1 -rb)/rb will make losses, and d', being t positive profits. Suppose now the aggregate quantity of insurance offered b agents cannot reach the region of overinsurance, but only allocations either o in the first case, additional positive insurance at a price slightly higher tha second case, any intermediary selling part of the latent can unilaterally deviate quantity of the latent contracts will be insufficient to trigger the agents' react of intermediaries selling each an infinitesimal amount of the latent contract point of tangency, i.e., of local satiation). A profitable deviation exists, then, latent contracts at a price less than (1 -rb)/rb. The only equilibrium contrac contracts at a price dJI/d I = (1 -rb)/rb, for any j E J2. To trigger age contracts will be available in any quantity (i.e., they have to be divisible) up reply for intermediaries, the number of intermediaries selling the latent contra quantity offered by any m -1 intermediaries large enough to satiate agents for any j C J2). Q.E.D.
Any equilibrium allocation sustained by latent contracts (according to Lemma A1) must then satisfy (7), by definition: more precisely, it must belong to (7), the subset of points c such that CL > c' for any c' in (7) with TrbCH + (1 -rb)C = rbCH + (1 -7 b)CL.
Proof of Proposition 3. Latent contracts deter entry, but also intermediaries that are active in equilibrium must be prevented from deviating and charging a higher price for their part of the aggregate insurance. If U(c, a) > U(c -dj, a) for some j C Ji, there is some contract dij (with a higher price) that is more profitable than dj. The equilibrium requires U(c, a) = U(c -d, a) for all j E J1. With n active intermediaries, such a condition implies dJ = (l/n) [c -w: isoprofit lines have a slope (1 -ra)/ra, less steep than the indifference curve, so no deviation is profitable.
We will now show that positive profits are necessary in equilibrium: a point of intersection of (7) with the zero-profit line, as cob in Figure 2 , cannot be an equilibrium with nonexclusivity. To be an equilibrium for some number of active intermediaries n > 1, the indifference curve should cut the zero-profit line twice, at cob = w + d and at w + [(n -1)/n]d (or, in the limit as n -* oo, be tangent). But with action e = a, indifference curves have a slope (1 -7ra)/ra at full insurance and a steeper slope in the region of underinsurance. In this region, then, they can only cut the zero-profit line once from above. Therefore cob cannot be supported as a high-action equilibrium with n active intermediaries. Nor can it be supported with n = 1: a configuration in which only one intermediary sells the active zero-profit contract and others offer latent contracts is not an equilibrium configuration, since the active intermediary could do better, given the equilibrium choice of the others, by charging a higher price to reach a point along (7), associated with positive profits. Q.E.D.
Notice that the arguments in the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 require that for an open subset of consumption 
